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INTRODUCTION  
 
There is a growing awareness in urban social science of the importance of real estate as a 
medium by which major cities are embedded within global capital networks (Halbert et al., 
2014) and a ’rediscovery’ of real estate as a topic for critical urban analysis (Christophers, 
2010; Gotham, 2006; Lizieri and Pain, 2014) Real estate developers and investors play critical 
roles in city centre transformations, with that development potentially at conflict with urban 
planning and the needs of households across the social spectrum in those cities (Lizieri, 2009).  
 
Development in cities requires land that is, outside command economies, generally in private 
ownership. Thus land owners play a mediating role in shaping urban form – particularly where 
they hold monopolistic or quasi-monopolistic stakes in a city. Land monopoly was, for long, a 
major topic of debate in social sciences, given its alleged pervasive influence on socio-
economic performance and wealth disparities. Discussions of land were central to the work of 
19th century political economists and in analyses of agriculture and poverty in Europe and the 
USA at the time. 
 
History and sociology rely heavily on land monopoly as a conceptual framework and see it as 
a deterrent to social change and progressiveness in rural medieval Europe, while dismissing its 
importance for predominantly urban, contemporary economies. This rural bias in the original 
land monopoly controversies may have had an impact on the current dearth of analyses (Ward 
& Aalbers, 2016).  
 
Mainstream economics has essentially remained silent about land monopoly, having moved 
away from traditional concerns over land ownership, agriculture, and poverty. By contrast, we 
argue that land monopoly is an important research subject for two reasons: a) detection of land 
monopoly remains a Marxian urban land economics academic challenge (Ekonomakis, 2003); 
and b) under land monopoly conditions, landowners’ “strikes” are feasible, with the important 
welfare implication that land taxation will not be neutral (Garza & Lizieri, 2016). 
 
This paper specifies a set of spatial empirical tests of land monopoly in a medium-sized urban 
economy of a developing country, Barranquilla, Colombia. To do so, Evans’s (1991) land 
 monopoly theory is used, framed within Deng’s (2009) taxonomy of cases that solve the Coase 
(1972) paradox of the impossibility of a durable goods monopoly. We will show that the urban 
spatial structures that resemble land monopoly conditions in a Coasian perspective, also fulfil 
the requirements for a spatial urban land monopoly in Marxian terms (Houghton, 1993). 
 
In many economies, large urban land plots are owned by the state or mixed-economy 
institutions, with implications on real estate markets and planning processes (Haila, 2014). In 
contrast, our case study offers exceptional conditions for assessment, as the subject city has a 
high degree of landownership concentration in its highly regulated northern fringe, an area 
destined for elite residential and commercial development. This landowner is a fully private 
real estate corporation, in a neoliberal urban policy setting; consequently, we have an almost 
pure context for land monopoly assessment. 
 
We seek to make two contributions to the urban literature: a) to refocus attention to the 
importance of land in urban development; and b) to develop and apply a novel analytic 
approach to land monopoly in an emerging economy where land issues are prominent. This 
approach echoes Park (2014), spatially testable hypotheses are derived from a workhorse 
Marxian differential rents theoretical model. Our testable hypotheses separate the effect of a 
spatial land monopoly from those associated to urban regulation, location, and economic 
performance.   
 
Following this introduction, section two sets out the conceptual problem involved in the land 
monopoly question, while producing a set of spatial econometric specifications. In section 
three, we explain the advantages of the selected case study, and present our data.  The fourth 
section presents empirical results, and section five concludes. 
 
 
LAND MONOPOLY  
 
Urban economics and land monopoly  
Land monopoly has largely disappeared from the urban economics research agenda. Despite 
the dearth of recent studies, from the existing literature we can infer four broad approaches: 
• Land owners are monopolists as a class, a statement drawn from classical authors such as 
Ricardo or Marx; 
 • Landowners are site monopolists, due to the unique location characteristics of each 
individual plot of land.  
• Land use regulation produces land monopolies, in particular the granting of development 
rights with a spatial schedule (Fischel, 1985); 
• Land owners behave as monopolists in the microeconomic sense of the term. Evans (1991) 
extrapolates this from the Marxian concept of monopoly rent, but asserts that application 
of microeconomics, even from outside the Marxian tradition, may simplify the concept and 
its implications1. 
 
In the last case, surplus is not simply called economic profit but rather (Marxian) monopoly 
rent since it is imposed by the land seller over and above location rents. This means, contrary 
to criticisms (Foldvary, 1993), that it goes beyond site monopoly. 
 
This paper focuses on this fourth approach but, to enhance Evans’s argument, we take into 
account that land is a durable good and, as such, is limited by the Coase paradox (1972). This 
paradox can be summarized as an inter-temporal selling dilemma for the owner of all the land 
in a country or city. If the owner tries to retain some land to increase prices, rational buyers 
will not buy until all land goes on sale. If some buyers paid for overpriced land in the first 
period, they would suffer asset losses during the second period devaluation as the monopolist 
put the remaining land up for sale2. 
 
The Coase paradox makes sense in an urban land economics context because each plot of land 
is assumed to be sold at its ‘maximum and highest use’, where there is no place for a land 
monopolist. The development potential of each plot of land in a city is determined by its 
location characteristics, environmental quality, and the regulatory framework (Anas et al., 
1998).  
 
The non-existence of land monopolies has been challenged by historical experience of 
landowners’ “strikes”, although they have not been a long-term strategy (Needham, 1981). This 
is why Deng (2009) reassesses the Coase paradox when urban land is not just a durable good, 
                                                          
1 Evans plays down the welfare economic implications of a land monopoly, by stressing that from a planner’s 
point of view it is better to deal with one large landlord-developer than with a myriad of small firms (Evans, 
2004). 
2 Even where renting (rather than selling), it is still in the interest of the landlord to rent all of the land in order to 
achieve maximum income 
 but a bundle of pure land and a public good that allows it to be used for urban purposes. In his 
interpretation, there exists a set of cases where the public good can be provided either by the 
land monopolist or by the local government.  
 
Deng uses a two-period bundle of goods model, in order to derive a taxonomy of cases. Under 
different assumptions on population distribution and strictness of the regulatory framework, 
his simulations determine different profit and welfare combinations. The simulations resemble 
some real life cases in the United States where large suburban real estate developments become 
local governments in their own right, controlled by “first period” buyers. We retain from 
Deng’s simulations the following set of results:  
• More plots of land are allocated when the government has to provide the public good, and 
profits are higher. 
• If a community is predominantly wealthy, more plots are allocated and profit is higher.  
• There is a positive relationship between more restrictive zoning and profit, with welfare 
increasing effects in predominantly wealthy communities. 
 
In other words, land monopoly pricing is more feasible in wealthier neighbourhoods, with 
public provision of infrastructure, and with stricter urban regulation.  
 
Spatial land monopoly: the search for specification  
Evans’s analysis of land monopoly relies on the idea that it is mistaken to follow the Ricardian 
concept of a perfectly inelastic land supply curve. In Evans’s (2004) critique, land supply will 
be perfectly inelastic only when all available land in a region (or an island such as Great Britain 
as in the classic analysis of Ricardo) has been utilised.  
 
We might argue, against this idea, that the owner of each plot of land is already a site 
monopolist because of the irreproducibility of its location. Further, even if all available land on 
an island is used, it may be possible to create more, and the owners of the newly-created 
locations will still be site monopolists due to the locational characteristics3 
 
                                                          
3 The possibility of creating new land, as in the Netherlands, challenges Evans’s interpretation of Ricardo, but it 
does not refute the existence of site monopolists (Needham, 1992). The “man-made” islands of Harvey (1974) 
also fall under this category: landowners influence the planning process in the limited granting of development 
rights with a spatial agenda.  
 Even if we question the starting point for Evans’ criticisms, his insights are useful for the 
empirical formulation of a land monopoly test. We must remember that Evans’ approach to 
land monopoly draws from Marxian urban land economics where the existence of absolute 
urban land rent remains a valid intellectual challenge (Park, 2014; Jaramillo, 2009). 
 
Evans uses a shopping mall as an example, where rental spaces that are in all physical senses 
equal are, nonetheless, allocated to different uses with different rents. In a competitive context, 
different tenants would equalize their space demand requirements at the same rental price. In 
contrast, a central manager would allocate the space discriminating prices between tenants 
according to their marginal income. 
 
We extrapolate Evans’s ideas to the city level by stating that a land monopolist must be able to 
exploit the different income to land price elasticities of the separate individual demands to be 
allocated inside its plot of land. The land monopolist would be then able to overprice each 
subdivision accordingly, and those extra rents are added to what determined by location. 
Following the Marxian logic of Houghton (1993), land rents could be monopolistic if the 
landowner zone has exclusive location and regulatory characteristics, which cannot be found 
anywhere else in the metropolitan region. This situation coincides with our case study zone 
which satisfies Deng’s above-mentioned land monopoly conditions. The detection of these 
spatial patterns with city level information is the subject of the next section. 
 
Conceptual Structure of the Testing Frameworks  
This section presents a spatial econometric structure to be estimated under different 
specifications to test for the existence of a land monopoly. We consider land rent per square 
metre in each location and period 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, to be determined by panel variables like property type 
𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, pure cross-sectional variables like distance to the CBD 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖, and regulatory framework as 
summarized by height limits ℎ𝑖𝑖. Other determinants are pure time-series variables such as city 
building output 𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖, and income per capita in each period 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖: 
 
 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = (𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,ℎ𝑖𝑖 ,𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖,𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖)                        (1) 
 
 Income is a demand side force that increases land rents in the entire city; however, its impact 
should be different in the land monopolist’s zone (𝑖𝑖 = 𝐴𝐴), compared to its most comparable 
neighbours (𝑖𝑖 = 𝐵𝐵), and over any other property in the city (𝑖𝑖 ≠ 𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵): 
 
 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  (𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,ℎ𝑖𝑖 ,𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖,𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖) + 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖[𝑖𝑖 = 𝐴𝐴] + 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖[𝑖𝑖 = 𝐵𝐵]                 (2) 
 
This is where our testing framework does more than check the higher prices in the land 
monopoly zone, which could be due to spatial segregation or environmental amenities. In our 
analysis, the income impact on the different zones should follow a spatial structure as 
determined by the corresponding spatial weights matrices (𝑊𝑊𝐴𝐴) for the land monopolist zone 
and (𝑊𝑊𝐵𝐵) for its neighbours (Lacombe, 2004). Given different observations over time, the 
estimation framework will be satisfied by Kronecker-expanding these matrices over all periods 
𝑇𝑇 (following Anselin et al., 2008). 
 
In equation 2, a pure time-series variable 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 affects the dependent variable 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 through its own (𝑊𝑊) spatial structure. Specifically, recall that in a cross-sectional framework, a positive sign 
on the spatial autoregressive parameter means that its spatial distribution clusters high values 
together: a situation compatible with Evans’ land monopolist spatial discrimination, and on a 
plot of land that has an independent internal spatial structure from the citywide spatial land 
prices structure (Houghton, 1993)4.  
 
The impact of income on prices is made of two components: one causes higher land prices in 
all locations, and the second is local and causes prices changes to be different in each location, 
as represented in Figure 1.  
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
This idea is employed in a panel estimation with the impact of income on land prices divided 
into two components: 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 + (𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇⨂𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁)𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖. The first is the city income per period 𝑡𝑡 
positively related with the land prices in all the locations per period 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 → 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖. The second 
                                                          
4 We also tested cubic-spline price functions (Muñiz, et al., 2003), but they did not perform adequately in terms 
of significance and signs. We ruled them out as our preferred citywide spatial land prices structure. 
 component is the same income in each of the 𝑇𝑇 periods, weighted by the spatial matrix for 
𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇𝑦𝑦𝑇𝑇[𝑇𝑇 = 𝑡𝑡] → 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖[𝑇𝑇 = 𝑡𝑡] where 𝑁𝑁 is the number of locations. 
 
We cannot separate time and spatial effects in the second component, as time will be pooled 
over all cross-sectional units in a panel estimation. However, both effects must be positive in 
order to produce a positive second component. To have positive income to land price elasticity 
mediated by positive spatial correlation, means that the positive income to land price elasticity 
is higher in the more expensive locations. This pattern is consistent with a spatial agenda of 
land price discrimination, as required by our spatial land monopolist process, which goes 
beyond merely having higher than average prices (Needham et al., 2011)5. Figure 1 represents 
this process.  
 
We perform the same estimation for a control group, the zone immediately neighbouring that 
of the (potential) land monopolist. If we find the same spatial patterns, we will conclude that a 
price discriminating land monopoly does not cause it, because that neighbouring zone does not 
exhibit extreme concentration of land ownership. The estimated parameters are then compared 
to test whether the spatial income to land price elasticity is higher in the monopolist zone than 
in its neighbours. This is the Spatially Controlled (SCM) panel to be estimated: 
 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖, 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙ℎ𝑖𝑖 , 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖,𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) + 𝜎𝜎𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾𝑊𝑊𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 + 𝜂𝜂𝑊𝑊𝐵𝐵𝑇𝑇𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖         (3) 
 
The variables are introduced as logarithms enabling direct assessment of the parameters as 
elasticities. We include a set of control variables 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, and focus in the spatial (𝛾𝛾, 𝜂𝜂) and non-
spatial (𝜎𝜎) income to land price elasticities. 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 are the panel error terms. 
 
We expect the parameter 𝜎𝜎 to be positive, and 𝛾𝛾 to be positive and significantly larger than 𝜂𝜂. 
These are the conditions for a spatially structured income to land price elasticity in the 
monopolist zone. If, by contrast, we find that 𝛾𝛾 is negative or significantly smaller/non-
different from 𝜂𝜂, this would suggest that land concentration does not drive the spatial income 
to land price elasticity. 
 
                                                          
5 In the sense that land monopoly is not just the result (higher prices), but includes the process (spatially 
differentiated income-to-land-price elasticities) (Park, 2014).   
 Once we have detected spatially structured and different income to land price elasticities by 
zone, we assess if the land monopolist zone commands ‘over and above’ prices. We use two 
variables to detect this pattern: (𝑎𝑎) for the land monopolist zone and (𝑏𝑏) for the neighbour. 
There is overpricing if 𝜋𝜋 is positive and larger than 𝜌𝜌 in equation (4):  
 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖, 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙ℎ𝑖𝑖, 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖,𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) + 𝜎𝜎𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 + 𝜋𝜋𝑎𝑎 + 𝜌𝜌𝑏𝑏 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (4) 
 
Finally, we use a Spatially Autoregressive component (SAR) to check the required positive 
spatial autocorrelation of the land prices regardless of city-wide location, in both the land 
monopolist zone 𝐴𝐴, and its neighbour 𝐵𝐵. We do not use the entire city spatial weights matrix, 
because the neighbouring zone is the most similar to the land monopolist one and, hence, its 
most appropriate control group: 
 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖, 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙ℎ𝑖𝑖 , 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖,𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) + 𝜎𝜎𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿𝑊𝑊𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜃𝜃𝑊𝑊𝐵𝐵𝑇𝑇𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (5) 
 
This use of spatial econometrics is not simply exploiting the spatial character of contemporary 
databases (Gibbons and Overman, 2012). We use spatial econometrics because we are trying 
to resemble the processes represented in Figure 1, with information from an entire metropolitan 
area. This is why further explorations in the use of Spatial Error and Spatial Durbin models, 
popular in recent literature on spatial econometrics, are beyond the requirements of our tests. 
 
In addition, this case study will not have to separate direct and indirect effects of the Spatial 
Lag component in equation (3) (LeSage & Pace, 2009). The spatial weights do not cover all 
the area under analysis, nor all the periods of the panel, and consequently, the income parameter 
is not affecting itself and the dependent variable indirectly (Elhorst, 2014). While we do not 
have marginal effects, we just need to be sure that the SAR components are positive and 
significant in equation (5). 
 
 
A CASE STUDY: BARRANQUILLA, COLOMBIA 
 
The context  
 Barranquilla, the fourth largest Colombian city, sits between the Magdalena River to the east 
and the Caribbean Sea to the north. The conurbation includes two municipalities: Barranquilla 
(population: 1,148,606), and Soledad (503,477). Map 1 shows the two municipalities, with 
blocks of built environment represented as grey polygons. The historic centre of the city, as 
represented by the town hall, is presented along with key traditional landmarks: El Prado hotel 
(built 1930); the Stadium (1985); and the Buena Vista shopping mall (2001). These landmarks 
are sub-centres in cubic-spline price functions that, however, did not report correct signs and 
significance in the regression analyses presented below and were thus not explored further in 
the empirical application. The land owned by a single landowner around Buena Vista mall is 
represented in Map 1 as a red bounded polygon; it is equivalent to 90% of all the feasible 
northern urban expansion land, according to the 2001 Master Plan. 
 
[Map 1 about here] 
 
High-income residential and retail neighbourhoods occupy the red bounded polygon and its 
surroundings. Middle income neighbours are located towards the south and southeast. 
Industrial zones and low-income neighbourhoods are located on the south and south-western 
peripheries, typical of Latin American informal urbanization. We note that, despite the informal 
sector, urban land markets do exist and exhibit an upward price trend (Carazo, 2011). 
 
The landowner of the red polygon in Map 1 was a cement corporation, founded in the 1930s 
on peripheral land with direct access to mining facilities and a river port. Subsequently, the 
manufacturing plant closed and city development has reached the outer limits of this large plot 
of land6. The company has transformed into a real estate corporation, which accomplishes the 
process named ‘urbanization’ in Colombia: it requests land development permissions from the 
local authority, adds local connective infrastructure (although not all of it), and then proceeds 
to sell the land to developers. These, in turn, build elite residential and commercial 
developments under stricter regulation conditions than in other areas of the city7. These 
characteristics: private ownership, land concentration, upper-class land uses, and stricter 
                                                          
6 Local analysts have guessed that this company has manipulated the city planning process in order to attract 
development in the direction of its plot of land (Garza, & Tovar, 2009). A large landowner with strong political 
influence, but not necessarily the exercise of monopolist market power. 
7 As opposed to the locations where poor inhabitants dwell, where regulation is largely absent, consistent with the 
typical Latin American pattern of spatial segregation (Alfonso, 2012).  
 regulation, make this case the most likely land monopolist scenario in above presented Deng’s 
taxonomy.  
 
 
Land Prices and Database Construction  
This research uses appraisal data from the publication “El Valor del Suelo Urbano en 
Barranquilla y su Area Metropolitana” by Lonja de Propiedad Raiz de Barranquilla, the local 
association of real estate professionals in the city of Barranquilla. The publication is the result 
of a collective effort to use appraisal information to highlight spatial land price structure and 
trends in the city in the period 2000 – 2010. 
 
Appraisals are carried out on request from involved stakeholders in real estate markets (sellers, 
buyers, mortgage banks, government, etc.). In Colombia, the professionals associated with the 
Lonjas produce private but regulated appraisals, which are legally examined when considered 
biased or leading to unsatisfactory business decisions. In general terms, surveying is considered 
a reasonably competent profession in the country. As a result, the appraisals may be noisy but 
should not be systematically biased.  
 
The appraisals report land prices for both developed and undeveloped properties, as surveyors 
use residual valuation techniques to determine pure land value in the case of already developed 
plots of land. It is important to use land values (as appraised) because our analysis deals with 
pure land rents as a function of location.  
 
From the dataset, we compiled those observations that had all of the characteristics required 
for empirical analysis; these were 4,384 independent valuations for the entire period 2000-
2010. This information is represented in Map 2 over a background map of the built environment 
in the Barranquilla-Soledad conurbation.  
 
[Map 2 about here] 
 
In the first panel of Map 2 we present the blocks in Barranquilla and Soledad classified 
according to their socio-economic status or estrato. The estrato is a national housing survey 
spatial classification ranging from 1 (the poorest) to 6 (the wealthiest). As we can see in the 
 map, Barranquilla contains all 6 estratos, while the top estrato in Soledad is 3, since it is a 
smaller and poorer municipality. 
 
In the second panel, we present the appraisals and land prices (2012 constant COP$) in 2010. 
As expected, most of the observations are in the northern and north-western areas of the city 
where high income housing and commercial activities are located. In a typical Latin American 
city, these submarkets are more connected to formal financial mechanisms and the 
corresponding formal appraisal processes. 
 
We deal with this selection bias in the dataset by aggregating property level information into 
larger spatial units: the blocks. These are the minimal built environment units surrounded by 
streets and roads in the background of Map 2. The blocks are spatial units small enough to 
produce micro-spatial econometric relationships, while diminishing selection bias and the 
extreme difference in individual appraisals. Barranquilla-Soledad has, in total, 7,224 blocks. 
 
The panel structure is unbalanced since not all blocks have values in all the years of the 
database. The resulting land prices database per block is depicted in Map 3, where the first 
panel shows the 1,984 different blocks with information in at least one of the years under 
analysis. The maps shows 38 blocks located inside the land monopolist area, depicted in 
yellow. These blocks comprise the land monopolist spatial weights matrix 𝑊𝑊𝐴𝐴. 
 
[Map 3 about here] 
 
In order to determine the blocks to be included in the neighbours’ spatial weights matrix, we 
averaged the distance between all of the block-observations and used it as a geographical 
threshold for a spatial buffer departing from each point of the boundary of the land monopolist 
zone. The threshold thus defined was 6,895 meters: all the 780 blocks fully or partially included 
are depicted in light red in the first panel of Map 3. These blocks comprise the neighbours’ 
spatial weights matrix 𝑊𝑊𝐵𝐵, the ‘North’. 
 
In order to offer contrast options to the North as neighbours’ spatial weights matrix 𝑊𝑊𝐵𝐵, we 
take a buffer equivalent to 1/3 of the average distance (2,298 metres) an area that includes 279 
blocks identified in red in Map 3. Another contrast matrix was produced with a buffer 
 equivalent to 1/3 the former distance (766 metres), designated as “Closer Neighbour” and 
identified in dark red. All the other blocks in the city with information in at least one year are 
identified in blue in the first panel of Map 3.  
 
The right panel of Map 3 reports land prices per block in 2010. We observe that the extreme 
values in the classification (the legend) have moderated while retaining the general spatial 
structure of Map 2. There has been also an upward trend in prices, particularly between 2005-
10, as identified by Payares (2012). 
 
Other variables – The variables gathered for each year-block and used in the empirical section 
are: 
• Estrato: as above, this is a standardized Colombian geographical classification based on 
built environment quality and proxies for wealth. This variable is introduced in the 
estimations as a dummies, with estratos 1 and 2 as the baseline. The resulting parameter 
should be positive and increasing in estrato rank. 
• Building Output: this is Construction GDP for Atlántico, the province where Barranquilla-
Soledad is located. Atlántico has 2,373,550 inhabitants so the city has a disproportionate 
share in the population (73%) and economy of the province. We could not find more 
disaggregated information, so this is a pure time-series variable, and it is expected to have 
a positive effect on land price. 
• Height: as determined by city regulations. Theory predicts city-wide land price increases 
due to height limits, but also lower land prices in the blocks where height is limited (Anas 
et al., 1998). It is expected to have a positive impact on prices. 
• Soledad: this is a dummy variable for all of the blocks in the municipality of Soledad. We 
expect this to have a negative influence, because the southern municipality is poorer.  
• Count: this is the number of appraisals per block-year. It may be positively related to price 
because when more appraisals are performed on a block, it indicates higher market potential 
or activity levels and greater informational certainty. This is precisely the selection bias 
when using individual appraisals and, hence, the use of block averages. 
 • Euclidean Distance: in metres from the centroid of each block to the Town Hall represented 
in Map 1. We expect this to show a negative sign, consistent with standard urban economics 
models8.  
• Income per capita: this is a pure time-series variable (available for Atlántico, the province 
that contains Barranquilla) and we expect it to be positively related to prices. This variable 
will also be used in conjunction with the spatial matrices to perform the spatial income-
price elasticity tests explained in section 2. 
• Property types: dummy variables for each of five property types: Housing, Apartment, 
Commercial, Industrial and Empty Lot.  
 
A summary of these information sources, adaptation to the block-level panel estimation 
environment and units of measurement, is presented in Table 1. The corresponding descriptive 
statistics are reported in Table 2, including information for each of the three candidate 
neighbour zones. The extended neighbours should be the best control zone because of lower 
average land price; by contrast, the average price in the closer neighbours is actually higher 
than in the monopolist zone. This selection process will be further explained in the empirical 
section below. 
 
Table 1: Summary of information sources, precision, and units of measurement 
                                                          
8 To calculate in-route distances in the absence of GPS tracked observations would require us to design an 
optimization algorithm, which will be dependent upon initial assumptions and will not necessarily add too much 
to the analysis. 
 
  
 
  
Variable Type Final Spatial Precision
Original Spatial 
Precision Source Units
Land Price Unbalanced Panel Blocks per Year
Property 
Appraisal Lonja
2012 constant 
COP$  per M2
Building 
Output
Time-
Series City per Year City per Year DANE
Square 
meters
Estrato Cross-Section Block Block
City 
Cartography Dummy
Height Cross-Section Block 
Block Fractions  
and/or set of 
Blocks
City 
Cartography Floors
Soledad Cross-Section Block Block
City 
Cartography Dummy
Count Unbalanced Panel Block
Property 
Appraisal Lonja Count
Distance Cross-Section Block Centroid Block Centroid
City 
Cartography Meters
Population Time-Series City per Year City per Year DANE Number
Income Time-Series City per Year City per Year DANE
2012 constant 
COP$  per M2
Property 
types
Unbalanced 
Panel Block per Year
Property 
Appraisal Lonja Dummy
Built Price Unbalanced Panel Block per Year
Property 
Appraisal Lonja
2012 constant 
COP$  per M2
Lot Size Unbalanced Panel Block per Year
Property 
Appraisal Lonja
Square 
meters
 Table 2: Descriptive statistics of the information per blocks (2,987 block-year) 
 
 
 
 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
Land Monopoly Tests 
This section uses spatial econometrics, acknowledging the fact that we cannot use panel effects 
because the spatial weighting process is already functioning as a type of fixed effect, repeated 
Mean Std. Dev. Max min
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n = 1,527 101,167 69,769 1,100,000
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259,882 176,558
Variable
Land price
 across cross-sections (La Sage & Pace, 2009). In order to control for endogeneity problems, 
we use this Pooled FML System version of Equation (3)9: 
   
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖, 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙ℎ𝑖𝑖 , 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖,𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) + 𝜎𝜎𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾𝑊𝑊𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 + 𝜂𝜂𝑊𝑊𝐵𝐵𝑇𝑇𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
(6) 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝜆𝜆 + 𝜒𝜒𝑗𝑗(𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) + 𝜓𝜓𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
 
This System FML estimation has only one source of simultaneity, the effect of the Income to 
the Land Price mediated by the spatial lag only for the zones A and B: that is, a spatially 
controlled single equation and then a non-spatially controlled system estimation10. 
Consequently, we do not need to estimate the spatial parameters sequentially (Rey and Boarnet, 
2004; Liu and Lee, 2013). 
 
The Built Price 𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 has its own set of 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 explanatory variables and controls (Land Area and 
Year Dummies), and the 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 land price. 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is its vector of panel errors. Results for equation (6) 
are presented in Table 3. The Table also includes results with SAR and dummies, system 
versions of equations (4) and (5). 
 
All of the theory variables, property types and estratos have their expected signs and are 
significant in Table 3 (estratos also have their expected ordering of the absolute value 
parameters). The controls Soledad and Count have their expected signs and are significant. 
This is a well-behaved econometric baseline, on top of which we can perform the spatial land 
monopoly tests. 
 
The models Sys1 to Sys7 report the results when using just the previously presented Extended 
Neighbour matrix11. Model Sys2 includes the spatial income to land price elasticities, and Sys3 
includes SAR components: both were significant, and significantly larger for the land 
monopolist according to the Wald test. However, a direct assessment of the ‘over and above’ 
                                                          
9 Instrumented and non-instrumented results (Limited Maximum Likelihood) were almost identical to the system 
results presented here, and can be delivered upon request. However, system estimation offers the best possible 
approach to equations (3), (4) and (5), for two reasons: a) we do not have enough variables to choose from as 
instruments, but enough to have separate price determinants for land and built environment; and b) the system 
controls land price endogeneity, which is the estimation problem in the first place. 
10 Equation (6) has different determinants on every equation, except the land price as common endogenous 
variable. 
11 All the spatial matrices have 4 neighbours, the structure that produced the highest goodness of fit. Different 
numbers of neighbours and alternative structures (inverse distance and Thiessen Polygons) produced the same 
signs and significance, but a lower goodness of fit.  
 condition in equation (4) is performed using dummy variables in models Sys4 to Sys7. The 
parameter was always positive and significant for the land monopolist zone, but positive and 
significantly larger for the neighbour (according to the Wald test), refuting the existence of a 
land monopoly. The most comprehensive model Sys7, also refutes the hypothesis, the 
neighbours have both significantly higher income-to-land-price-elasticity and over-pricing.   
 
We infer from these results, that the higher prices in the monopolist zone in Table 2, cannot be 
attributed to land ownership concentration. In fact, the entire northern section of the city has 
higher than average prices (including the land monopolist zone), possibly due to city-wide 
patterns of spatial segregation (Garza & Tovar, 2009). 
 
In order to contrast the results obtained when using the Extended Neighbours’ spatial matrix, 
we perform estimations for other two candidate control zones: Neighbour and Closer 
Neighbour. The results are in models Sys8 to Sys11, where the quality of all the theory and 
control variables hold. In addition, the land monopolist income-to-land-price elasticity is not 
significant in the comprehensive models Sys9 and Sys10. 
 
All the regressions have similar Log-Likelihood, Akaike and Schwartz criteria, but the 
Neighbour and Closer Neighbour regressions have larger Standard Errors than the equivalent 
Extended Neighbour regressions. We consider this extended zone the most convenient control 
zone, hence it will be used in the regressions presented in Table 4. 
 
Criticisms can be directed to the selection of this Extended Neighbour as the control zone, 
because it could be fine-tuned to reject the land monopoly hypothesis; however, we argue that 
the opposite applies. In the regression results of Table 3, it was this wider zone that almost 
failed to reject the land monopoly hypothesis (the other two zones clearly rejected it). It is 
extended and includes low priced central and south-western properties that diminish the value 
of its dummy parameter. This is evident in its lower land price than the land monopoly zone in 
Table 2 and, hence, its use makes for a stronger test.  
  
 Table 3: System Estimation Land Monopoly Tests (Different Neighbours) 
 
 
 
Another source of criticism could be the small number of spatial units comprised in the Land 
Monopolist zone; however, its SAR component was positive and significant in model Sys3. 
This last observation is important, as both land monopolist and neighbour zones had positive, 
significant, and not statistically different SAR parameters, despite the use of a citywide land 
price gradient. This is a reliability indicator, where both zones have a spatial structure of their 
own with positive spatial correlation (market organization in the logic of Houghton, 1993). 
 
 
Constant1 -12.858 *** -12.679 *** -12.663 *** -12.591 *** -12.437 *** -12.380 *** -11.895 *** -12.137 *** -12.140 *** -12.204 *** -12.226 ***
Building Output 0.068 *** 0.069 *** 0.069 *** 0.070 *** 0.065 *** 0.066 *** 0.069 *** 0.071 *** 0.070 *** 0.071 *** 0.071 ***
Height 0.135 *** 0.108 *** 0.108 *** 0.130 *** 0.099 *** 0.094 *** 0.084 *** 0.132 *** 0.130 *** 0.138 *** 0.134 ***
Income 1.550 *** 1.536 *** 1.535 *** 1.534 *** 1.539 *** 1.537 *** 1.500 *** 1.505 *** 1.507 *** 1.512 *** 1.513 ***
Distance -0.169 *** -0.161 *** -0.160 *** -0.170 *** -0.189 *** -0.191 *** -0.181 *** -0.172 *** -0.173 *** -0.180 *** -0.178 ***
Monopoly Income elasticity · (1,000) 1.390 *** 0.663 ** 0.534 ** -0.036  0.973 *** 0.253  
Neighbour Income elasticity · (1,000) 1.125 *** 0.777 *** 1.127 *** 1.614 * 0.951 *** 1.689 ***
Monopoly SAR · (1,000) 1.797 ***
Neighbour SAR · (1,000) 1.503 ***
Monopoly Dummy 0.092 *** 0.096 *** 0.090 ** 0.119 *** 0.148 ***
Neighbour Dummy 0.246 *** 0.246 *** 0.204 *** -0.056  -0.112 ***
Empty Lot -0.426 *** -0.430 *** -0.429 *** -0.438 *** -0.433 *** -0.438 *** -0.434 *** -0.432 *** -0.437 *** -0.413 *** -0.418 ***
Residential -0.252 *** -0.242 *** -0.242 *** -0.251 *** -0.267 *** -0.267 *** -0.258 *** -0.253 *** -0.252 *** -0.252 *** -0.247 ***
Apartment 0.123 *** 0.104 *** 0.103 *** 0.120 *** 0.115 *** 0.113 *** 0.103 *** 0.117 *** 0.116 *** 0.120 *** 0.115 ***
Commercial 0.213 *** 0.206 *** 0.206 *** 0.215 *** 0.192 *** 0.193 *** 0.190 *** 0.213 *** 0.215 *** 0.214 *** 0.223 ***
Industrial -0.179 *** -0.198 *** -0.197 *** -0.178 *** -0.197 *** -0.197 *** -0.208 *** -0.183 *** -0.182 *** -0.185 *** -0.179 ***
Estrato3 -0.025  -0.023  -0.023  -0.024  -0.042 ** -0.041 ** -0.038 * -0.024  -0.024  -0.027  -0.027  
Estrato4 0.277 *** 0.205 *** 0.205 *** 0.280 *** 0.091 *** 0.094 *** 0.075 *** 0.280 *** 0.281 *** 0.267 *** 0.271 ***
Estrato5 0.630 *** 0.523 *** 0.520 *** 0.631 *** 0.449 *** 0.450 *** 0.405 *** 0.624 *** 0.623 *** 0.594 *** 0.599 ***
Estrato6 1.033 *** 0.913 *** 0.909 *** 1.023 *** 0.854 *** 0.845 *** 0.799 *** 0.997 *** 0.993 *** 0.917 *** 0.923 ***
Soledad -0.122 *** -0.121 *** -0.121 *** -0.121 *** -0.074 ** -0.073 ** -0.081 *** -0.118 *** -0.118 *** -0.106 *** -0.110 ***
Count 0.016 *** 0.017 *** 0.017 *** 0.016 *** 0.018 *** 0.018 *** 0.018 *** 0.016 *** 0.016 *** 0.015 *** 0.015 ***
Constant2 3.883 *** 3.814 *** 3.821 *** 3.707 *** 3.948 *** 3.902 *** 3.931 *** 3.739 *** 3.700 *** 3.857 *** 3.810 ***
Land Price 0.885 *** 0.892 *** 0.892 *** 0.902 *** 0.881 *** 0.884 *** 0.882 *** 0.899 *** 0.902 *** 0.888 *** 0.892 ***
Land Area -0.311 *** -0.313 *** -0.313 *** -0.313 *** -0.313 *** -0.313 *** -0.313 *** -0.312 *** -0.312 *** -0.312 *** -0.312 ***
2001 0.126  0.133  0.121  0.127  0.123  0.137  0.125  0.126  0.125  0.123  0.122  
2002 -0.085  -0.081  -0.093  -0.090  -0.079  -0.068  -0.083  -0.092  -0.092  -0.093  -0.094  
2003 -0.112  -0.109  -0.121  -0.121  -0.108  -0.098  -0.115  -0.122  -0.124  -0.118  -0.121  
2004 -0.264  -0.262  -0.273  -0.273  -0.270  -0.260  -0.273  -0.276  -0.277  -0.275  -0.274  
2005 -0.268  -0.265  -0.277  -0.278  -0.275  -0.264  -0.277  -0.283  -0.284  -0.278  -0.280  
2006 -0.455 * -0.458 * -0.470 * -0.466 * -0.457 * -0.446 * -0.461 * -0.464 * -0.465 * -0.463 * -0.467 *
2007 -0.688 *** -0.692 *** -0.704 *** -0.703 *** -0.687 *** -0.677 ** -0.689 *** -0.702 *** -0.706 *** -0.693 *** -0.699 ***
2008 -0.131  -0.128  -0.140  -0.141  -0.134  -0.124  -0.129  -0.138  -0.140  -0.133  -0.137  
2009 0.165  0.169  0.157  0.158  0.165  0.178  0.169  0.161  0.159  0.165  0.165  
2010 -0.012  -0.001  -0.013  -0.018  0.001  0.013  0.003  -0.017  -0.019  -0.013  -0.015  
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Maximum Likelihood Estimation – 2987 observations 
***Significant at 1%; **Significant at 5%; *Significant at 10% 
Wald tests reports the p-value of 𝐻𝐻0: ?̂?𝛽𝑘𝑘 = ?̂?𝛽𝑙𝑙  , of the Income Elasticities, SAR Components, and Dummies 
 Possible Monopoly in the Built Environment Market 
In this section, we explore if the relationships between income and location are mediated by 
built environment prices. Once again, we depart from equation (3) as a system:   
 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖, 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙ℎ𝑖𝑖, 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖,𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
(7) 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝜆𝜆 + 𝜒𝜒𝑗𝑗(𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) + 𝜓𝜓𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜙𝜙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 + 𝜗𝜗𝑊𝑊𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 + 𝜑𝜑𝑊𝑊𝐵𝐵𝑇𝑇𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
 
In this case, to the 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 set of 𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 explanatory variables and controls, we add the 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 income per 
capita, and the corresponding spatially-structured Income–to–Built–Price elasticities in the 
Land Monopoly Zone 𝑊𝑊𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 and its neighbours 𝑊𝑊𝐵𝐵𝑇𝑇𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖. Results using the above-selected 
Extended Neighbour control zone, are presented in Table 4. 
 
In Table 4, all the theory variables and controls have their expected signs and are significant. 
The application of monopoly tests on the Built Price equation always produces non-significant 
parameters for their elasticities and SAR (Sys13 to Sys15). Furthermore, Income is always 
non-significant when used in Sys12, Sys13 and Sys19, while the land monopoly dummy is 
significant only when controlled by the neighbour dummy in Sys18, and even in that case, non-
significantly different from the neighbour.  
 
According to the findings in Table 4, the spatial economic structures are defined by the Land 
Price and not by the Built Price, as theoretically expected. The dummies for overpricing were 
positive, significant and non-different when used together (Sys18), but the monopoly dummy 
was non-significant when including the income elasticities (Sys19), and the elasticities were 
never significant (Sys13, Sys14 and Sys19). The reasons for overpricing in the northern zone 
of the city are not in the built environment market, but in the land market.  
 
According to all the results presented, any land overpricing observed in northern zones of 
Barranquilla during 2001-2010, does not coincide with higher (and even significant) income-
to-land price elasticities. In addition, over-pricing is lower (or equal) in the land monopoly 
zone than in neighbouring control zones. Consequently, we must reject the existence of a 
spatial land monopoly in our case study. 
 
 We have not found evidence of a land monopoly à la Evans, in a case study that satisfies the 
theoretical requirements for such a behaviour (Deng, 2013; Houghton, 1993). From this, there 
is an important policy implication: landowners’ strikes are not feasible in the long term, land 
taxation and value capture strategies are market neutral, and cannot be passed forward to final 
land market users (Garza & Lizieri, 2016). 
 
CONCLUSIONS  
 
In this paper, we have sought to explore the economics of land monopoly in the context of a 
city in an emerging economy that has undergone significant urban transformation. If 
landowners with a monopolistic holding of key sites can exploit their ownership, they may be 
able to capture excess profits, affecting the distribution of the benefits of urban growth and the 
impact of urban policies like value-capture or land taxes. While there has been a refocusing of 
attention on the importance of real estate and capital flows into and out of property markets in 
urban studies, there has been less attention to land and land ownership and we have sought to 
make a contribution in that area.  
 
According to the Coase paradox, land monopoly is a theoretical impossibility when land is a 
commodity with its rent purely determined by location; but it becomes feasible if it is bundled 
with the public goods that make that land suitable for urban uses. In this last case, there will be 
a higher degree of land monopoly pricing when the government provides the public good, land 
regulation is strict, and its potential users are wealthy.  Land monopoly can be understood as a 
pricing strategy where the land rents lie ‘over and above’ what their location permits. 
 
In the particular case of Barranquilla’s northern fringe, a single private firm owns more than 
90% of all the land, which is destined for high-income housing and commercial developments, 
with strict urban regulation, and where the government carries the main connectivity expenses. 
This firm gets urban expansion permissions and then proceeds to sell the land to best-bidder 
developers. All of these conditions are ideal for land monopoly pricing, and to perform formal 
spatial tests. 
 
We have designed a spatial land monopoly test that uses a double spatial matrix weighting of 
the income to land price elasticities, and dummy variables to identify overpricing. We applied 
the test by using many different spatial econometric specifications, but none of these suggested 
 the existence of a land monopoly in the candidate zone, in spite of its high prices and extreme 
concentration of land ownership. 
 
Table 4: System Estimation Monopoly tests on Built Prices (Extended Neighbour) 
 
 
 
Our analysis is restricted by paucity of spatial information, which, in turn, affected modelling 
possibilities. The unbalanced structure of the panel information constrains our ability to 
produce more robust results, a problem that might be overcome by re-aggregating information 
Constant1 10.517 *** 10.664 *** 10.380 *** -8.870 *** -3.117 ** -4.536 *** -5.940 *** 10.506 ***
Building Output 0.203 *** 0.188 *** 0.211 *** 0.091 *** 0.122 *** 0.114 *** 0.104 *** 0.205 ***
Height 0.155 *** 0.186 *** 0.140 *** 0.137 *** 0.136 *** 0.140 *** 0.141 *** 0.149 ***
Distance -0.174 *** -0.183 *** -0.167 *** 1.287 *** 0.907 *** 1.002 *** 1.097 *** -0.174 ***
Income -0.170 *** -0.173 *** -0.174 *** -0.175 ***
Empty Lot -0.465 *** -0.455 *** -0.547 *** -0.413 *** -0.437 *** -0.377 *** -0.349 *** -0.398 ***
Residential -0.271 *** -0.288 *** -0.253 *** -0.256 *** -0.257 *** -0.263 *** -0.264 *** -0.268 ***
Apartment 0.108 *** 0.122 *** 0.110 *** 0.121 *** 0.118 *** 0.120 *** 0.121 *** 0.113 ***
Commercial 0.166 *** 0.166 *** 0.181 *** 0.207 *** 0.195 *** 0.198 *** 0.200 *** 0.178 ***
Industrial -0.268 *** -0.251 *** -0.227 *** -0.196 *** -0.212 *** -0.219 *** -0.220 *** -0.261 ***
Estrato3 -0.033 0.004 -0.027 -0.027 -0.029 -0.030 -0.031 -0.032
Estrato4 0.259 *** 0.299 *** 0.268 *** 0.273 *** 0.271 *** 0.263 *** 0.263 *** 0.255 ***
Estrato5 0.604 *** 0.644 *** 0.606 *** 0.626 *** 0.622 *** 0.617 *** 0.618 *** 0.601 ***
Estrato6 1.006 *** 1.056 *** 1.004 *** 1.029 *** 1.025 *** 1.025 *** 1.027 *** 1.009 ***
Soledad -0.114 *** -0.080 ** -0.129 *** -0.123 *** -0.124 *** -0.123 *** -0.123 *** -0.128 ***
Count 0.012 *** 0.012 *** 0.014 *** 0.015 *** 0.015 *** 0.015 *** 0.015 *** 0.013 ***
Constant2 0.047 0.373 2.269 * 4.758 *** 3.806 *** 6.405 *** 7.141 *** -112.42
Land Price 0.892 *** 0.852 1.049 *** 0.806 *** 0.893 *** 0.656 *** 0.588 *** 0.651 ***
Land Area -0.318 *** -0.309 *** -0.325 *** -0.308 *** -0.309 *** -0.310 *** -0.303 *** -0.306 ***
Income 0.234 0.251 7.445
Monopoly Income elasticity · (1,000) 2.040 0.944 1.531
Neighbour Income elasticity · (1,000) 0.344 -0.269 -0.306
Monopoly SAR · (1,000) 2.867
Neighbour SAR · (1,000) 0.698
Monopoly Dummy 0.194 0.513 ** 0.025
Neighbour Dummy 0.276 *** 0.302 *** 0.301 ***
2001 0.310 -0.013 0.009 0.117 0.111 0.101 0.084 0.320
2002 -0.081 -0.321 -0.379 -0.119 -0.157 -0.134 -0.141 0.142
2003 -0.166 -0.469 -0.589 ** -0.156 -0.236 -0.188 -0.176 0.104
2004 -0.319 -0.555 -0.678 ** -0.293 -0.362 -0.304 -0.293 -0.286
2005 -0.383 -0.557 -0.777 *** -0.293 -0.380 -0.298 -0.268 -0.609
2006 -0.373 -0.639 -0.743 *** -0.450 * -0.499 * -0.411 -0.392 -1.052
2007 -0.555 -0.789 -0.913 *** -0.653 ** -0.697 *** -0.577 ** -0.545 ** -1.829
2008 0.083 -0.135 -0.193 -0.083 -0.092 -0.015 -0.004 -1.283
2009 0.343 0.096 0.028 0.199 0.178 0.244 0.261 -0.827
2010 0.082 -0.154 -0.224 0.006 -0.038 0.050 0.057 -0.927
Log-Likelihood
Akaike
Schwartz
S.E. of Equation 1
S.E of Equation 2
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4.861
4.795
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Sys19
Unbalanced Pooled FML  
Maximum Likelihood Estimation – 2987 observations 
***Significant at 1%; **Significant at 5%; *Significant at 10% 
Wald tests reports the p-value of 𝐻𝐻0: ?̂?𝛽𝑘𝑘 = ?̂?𝛽𝑙𝑙  , of the Income Elasticities, SAR Components, and Dummies 
 into larger spatial units (although this approach is not without its disadvantages with the larger 
units masking micro-level spatial effects). Regardless of these constraints, the results hold 
consistently for a variety of specifications, while the spatial land monopoly test is innovative 
and potentially replicable in other cities. 
 
The absence of evidence of land monopoly is a valuable result for policy making, as it is the 
land monopoly what guarantees the possibility of long term landowners’ strikes, frustrating 
land use regulation, planning and taxation policies. Our results imply that landowners do not 
have strategic behaviour, and land value capture or other exactions cannot be avoided or 
brought forward in the price to be paid by final land users. 
 
Even though land monopoly pricing was not detected, the displacement of highly priced 
developments further north may not be a desirable result for Barranquilla. The traditional 
downtown is more accessible to lower income workers from the south of the city and mass 
public transit has yet to reach the northern area to any great extent. Moreover, as a monopolist 
land-market structure has not been detected, all of the welfare implications for the northern 
fringe development must be ‘urban planning’ related rather than ‘market concentration’ related. 
In this sense, even if pricing over and above location rents is not detected, the political influence 
of the land monopolist firm may still constitute an important source of inefficiencies and 
concern for an urban research agenda. By implication, the interaction between land ownership, 
political influence and economic power becomes a key focus for future research on urban 
development in growing cities.  
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Figure 1: Spatial Income-to-Land-Price elasticity 
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 Map 1: Barranquilla and Soledad, land monopoly zone and sub-centres 
 
Source: Own elaboration using city cartography block level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Map 2: Estratos and Land Prices (2012 constant COP$ per m2) in Barranquilla – Soledad 
Estratos in Barranquilla – Soledad Land Prices 2000 
  
Source: Own elaboration using city cartography block level and Lonja appraisals 
Map 2 (Continuation): Estratos and Land Prices (2012 constant COP$ per m2) in Barranquilla – Soledad 
Land Prices 2005 Land Prices 2010 
  
Source: Own elaboration using city cartography block level and Lonja appraisals 
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Map 3: Blocks per zones for spatial analysis and prices (2012 constant COP$ per m2). 
Blocks with at least one observation and 
spatial zones Land prices 2000 
  
Source: Own elaboration using city cartography block level 
 
 
 
Map 3: (continuation): Blocks per zones for spatial analysis and prices (2012 constant COP$ 
per m2). 
Land Prices 2005 Land Prices 2010 
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Source: own elaboration using city cartography block level 
 
 
 
